We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problem in presence of adverse selection. The particular features of electricity induce an unusual structure on the production cost, with no decreasing return to scale. We are nevertheless able to provide an explicit solution for the problem at hand. The optimal contracts are either linear or polynomial with respect to the consumption. Whenever the outside options offered by competitors are not uniform among the different type of consumers, we exhibit situations where the electricity provider should contract with consumers with either low or high appetite for electricity.
Introduction
Electricity is non-storable, except marginally: any quantity which is consumed now must be produced now, and conversely. This means that the installed capacity must be sufficient to supply electricity when demand is maximal. As a consequence, part of this installed capacity will stay idle when demand is lower. This is the overcapacity problem, which is compounded by the fact that electricity consumption is far from stable, and little substitutable. People turn the heating on when it is cold, and the air conditioning on when it is warm, they turn the light on as soon as it gets dark and the home appliances when they come back from work; unless they own a generator, there is no other source of energy they can turn to. So the collective demand for electricity must be satisfied, and satisfied right now. In reality, the capacity constraint is not binding: more electricity can always be found, by putting in service less efficient
We are able to solve the problem at hand in the present paper explicitly, in some polar cases. The tariff we find is quite natural. It consists in the sum of three components:
• A fixed component, independent of the consumption, which is a subscription to the service.
• A linear component, p(t)c(t), which consists simply of pricing the current consumption at the current price p(t). Recall that this price depends on time in order to discourage peak-hour consumption.
• A non-linear component, which depends on the current consumption c(t) in a non-linear way. This part appears only when c(t) is high enough. Its purpose is to make the high consumers pay for making the Principal produce at very high marginal cost. Indeed, since the production function has increasing marginal cost, a high consumer costs more per unit produced than a low consumer. In addition, since the cost is global, high consumers increase the marginal cost, and hence the price, for everybody
To understand the last point, let us assume that the producer uses a linear pricing rule, charging pc for a consumption of c, and that the producer thereby breaks even: total consumption is C, and profit is pC− K(C) = 0. Suppose a new consumer comes in. The total cost becomes K(C + c), and since K is convex (increasing marginal cost) and K(0) = 0, we have
and the profit becomes p(C + c) − K(C + c) < 0. To break even, the producer has to increase the price p for everybody. Of course, the larger c is with respect to C, the higher the increase, so high consumers are more costly than low ones. Using a non-linear pricing rule will somehow isolate the latter from the former.
In Principal-Agent models, one is used to the fact that the optimal contract for the Principal will exclude the low end of the market, that is, the least efficient Agents. Indeed, such shutdown contracts are quite commonplace in the adverse selection literature, see for instance the seminal papers of Guesnerie and Laffont [15] or Rochet and Choné [28] in discrete-time (see also the monograph by Laffont and Martimort for more details [24] ), or the more recent contributions of Cvitanić et al. [6] and Hernández Santibáñez et al. [17] in continuous-time. A remarkable feature of our problem is that, in certain circumstances, the optimal contract excludes the high end of the market: the most efficient agents, those who need less electricity to achieve the same degree of welfare than others, go elsewhere, and only the least efficient ones remain. This corresponds to situations of Cournot competition, where the welfare gain associated with increase in electricity consumption is small beyond a certain point (as in the case of domestic users: one does not need to heat or cool too much), so that the welfare is sensitive to price and not to consumption.
In that case it becomes worthwhile not to take part in that competition, which concerns the most efficient Agents, and to concentrate on the least efficient ones, who are still a long way from achieving saturation, and who are more sensitive to changes in consumption.
We now proceed to describe the main features of our model. The Principal's cost, as mentioned above, is a convex function of aggregate production. He offers a contract to the Agents, who may accept or decline it. If they accept, they commit for a period T > 0. They decline if the total utility they derive from the contract is less than some reservation utility, which may depend on the Agent, and which expresses the fact that she has alternative options, such as turning to an alternate provider, or substituting another energy source to electricity.
The Agents' utilities are separable: the utility which an agent of type x derives from consuming a quantity c of electricity at time t and being charged a (nonlinear) price p(c) is u(t, x, c) − pc, where u(t, x, ·) is a concave function of c. This separability assumption is traditional in Principal-Agent problems. In this case, there are additional justifications, as a large part of the Agents are industrial users, who consume electricity in order to produce other goods, so that their utility simply identifies to the profit they derive from this activity. Note also the time-dependence, which reflects the seasonality of consumption.
In the sequel, we will consider CRRA utilities, of the type γ −1 c γ , with γ < 1, and we will provide explicit solutions (except in the case γ = 0, or u(c) = ln c). The case γ < 0 reflects the "household" behavior, where electricity fulfills some basic needs, such as lighting or appliances, and 0 consumption is not acceptable while high consumption is not needed. The case 0 < γ < 1 reflects the "industrial" behavior, where high consumption is the norm, subject to decreasing returns to scale. Note, however, that in both cases there is a "fallback" option, a substitute to electricity when it becomes too expensive, for instance an alternative energy source, or simply another provider. This fallback option is expressed by a reservation utility, which may be constant or vary across Agents. Despite the particular structure of the cost function, we are able to solve explicitly the problem at hand. We observe that the optimal contract rewrites as the combination of a fixed cost together with two variable costs, proportional to either the electricity consumption or a power function of it. This tariff structure happens to be quite simple and quite close to the classical tariff structures offered by most electricity providers.
Whenever the fallback option is the same for every Agent, we observe as usual in Principal-Agent problems, that the lower end of the market is not covered: the low types (meaning those households who are less dependent on electricity, or those industry users who are less efficient) will not be offered contracts which they are willing to accept, and will have to fall back on the outside option. More interestingly, we are also able to solve explicitly the case where the fallback option of the Agents depends on their type in a concave manner. In this case, getting more efficient Agents can be too costly, and the electricity provider may concentrate on the less efficient but less expensive consumers.
Finally, a remark on the mathematics. We will be using u-convex analysis, a tool which has been introduced and developed elsewhere, notably by Carlier (see e.g. [5] , and which extends classical convex analysis. The economic interpretation of the mathematical formulas is straightforward. Forgetting for ease of presentation about time dependence, assume Agent x has the separable utility u(x, c) − p(c), as described above, and let the Principal set out a price schedule p(c). The maximal utility Agent x derives from this price schedule is max
This number is denoted by p (x), and called the indirect utility of Agent x. Note that it depends on the entire price schedule and it can be computed for each Agent x. In this way, we associate with each function p(c) a function p (x), which the economist knows as the indirect utility associated with p and which the mathematician knows as the u-conjugate or u-transform of p. Conversely, if the indirect utility p is known, the price schedule can be derived by the same formula
In the bilinear case, when u(x, c) = xc, we get the usual Fenchel formulas of convex analysis.
The first section of the paper sets the model and the main results, i.e. the expression of the tariffs for industrial and residential customers. The two next sections provide the main mathematical results for constant and concave increasing reservation utility; demonstrations are left for appendixes.
Main results
The model we are proposing is set up on Principal-Agent relationship where the Principal is an electricity provider and the Agents are electricity consumers. Since the electricity consumption is observed by the Principal, we suppose that there is no moral hazard. On the other hand, adverse selection is in force as the Agent's willingness to pay for electricity is not known by the Principal. This taste for electricity represents how much Agents price a given volume of electricity in term of usefulness. For an industrial Agent, this would represent the benefit he gets by running his industrial process with this given volume of electricity. For a residential Agent, this would represent the comfort he gets by using this given volume of electricity to perform domestic tasks (heating, lighting...). Of course, this depends on the Agent's efficiency of his equipment referred as his type X. As classically assumed in adverse selection setting, even if the Principal does not know the exact type of a particular Agent, he knows the repartition of Agents' type among the population. This hypothesis is realistic as the electricity provider can alway make surveys in order to acquire this information.
Players' objectives and electricity particularity
Both players have their particular objectives:
• Agent's objective is to choose the level of electricity consumption c at any time t, which maximize his utility for electricity u (t, x, c)with respect to his type x minus the tariff p(t, c) that he needs to pay for the electricity consumed
• Principal's objective is to offer the tariffs which maximize his own profits: all payments she receives from consumers accepting the contract minus the costs for providing the total volume of electricity consumed by her clients. The provider can offer power either by buying on the electricity market or by producing it herself.
The tariffs designed by the Principal need to respect two conditions. The first one is the individual rationality of the Agents. Indeed, Agents are not forced to accept the contract offered by the Principal as they can pick alternative electricity providers, offering better conditions. This is taken into account in the model via a reservation utility H which represents the minimum level of satisfaction that an Agent needs to achieve in order to accept the contract. This reservation utility could interprets as an aggregation of competitors' offers or as a minimum level of utility imposed by public services, who offer a regulated tariff. The second condition that tariffs are required to respect is the so-called incentive compatibility condition:, which will be automatically satisfied, as there is no moral hazard in this model.
One particular feature of electricity product is the fact that it suffers from decreasing returns to scale: its marginal price increases with the total aggregate consumption. This comes from the fact that several technologies can be used in order to produce electricity. Some power plants have no or very low fuel costs such as renewables (hydro power plants, wind or solar production...) or nuclear production. These types of productions are chosen for satisfying base-load consumption. But when, the electricity consumption increases such as in peak hours, other power plants (coal, gas or fuel thermal plants for example) need to be turned on and their cost of production is much more expensive. The electricity spot price shows this strong base/peak patterns and can exhibit high spikes when capacity productions reach their limit with respect to consumption. For this reason, we impose in our model that the electricity production cost of the Principal depends on the consumption of all her clients. In fact, this cost should depend on the consumption of all consumers and not only on all clients of this provider but we assume that aggregate consumption of clients who select the provider is correlated to the consumption of the other consumers. This is justified since there are strong common preferences and behaviors among consumers, for example consumptions are higher during daytime than during the night.
Notations and model assumptions
We consider CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function for the Agents.
where φ(t) represents the Agents' time preference for electricity. This factor is common to every Agent and typically represents for example the preference to have electricity during the daytime than during the middle of the night. x ∈ [0, 1] is the type of the Agent. We suppose that γ < 1 and we consider two different cases: γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ < 0. The function g γ represents the willingness of the Agents to pay for their consumption depending on their type x and we take typically g γ (x) = x if γ ∈ (0, 1) and g γ (x) = 1 − x if γ < 0. Graphic illustrations of the utility function are shown in figure 1 . The case γ ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to the modeling of industrial Agents, whose utility grows to infinity if they can have infinite volume of electricity: they can always make their industrial capacities grow and generate more benefits whenever they have extra electricity. On the contrary, they can stop producing if they could not get any electricity or substitute it by another energy, which corresponds to a zero utility whenever c = 0. The case γ < 0 illustrates the residential Agents utility for whom electricity is a staple product: they can not avoid consuming electricity (they would get −∞ utility). They also have a saturation for electricity : above a high volume of electricity, they do not gain much satisfaction with an extra volume because all their electrical needs are already fullfilled.
γ ∈ (0, 1) γ < 0 The indirect utility p (x) is the best level of utility that the Agent can obtain by signing the contract, which is entitled on the period [0, T ].
The Agent's decision to sign the contract depends on his reservation utility, denoted H(x) for an agent of type x: he signs the contract with the Principal if and only if P (x) ≥ H(x). We consider two cases for H(x), either a constant function or a concave one verifying that the elasticity of reservation utility is smaller than the the elasticity of willingness to pay for consumption, i.e.
The concavity of H indicates that competitors target principally the more efficient Agents. We denote by X * the set of Agents who end up signing the contract:
We suppose that Agents are uniformly distributed among the population and, as already mentioned, this feature is known by the Principal. We assume a convex cost of power production K:
The term k(t) is positive and indicates the time dependence of electricity production costs: for example photovoltaic production occurs only at day, wind is blowing more during winter... The power n > 1 reflects the production fleet composition: for example when the fleet has expensive peak power plants n is high.
Optimal tariffs
In the setting we previously described, the Principal-Agent problem can be explicitly solved. We present in this part only a brief sketch of the argumentation and formal mathematical proofs are postponed to the remaining sections of the paper. Let's stress out that the problem is solved without imposing any a priori structure of the tariff function, except that it only depends on time and consumption. In order to be admissible, a tariff p should verified the individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions, that is denoted p ∈ P. Let us write formally the objective function of the Agents U A and Principal U P
The demonstration is performed into five main steps:
• For a given tariff p, the optimal responding consumption of the Agents can be determined as a function of ∂p ∂x . This is injected in the Principal problem which is now a problem expressed in term of p only.
• In order to solve the Principal problem, we first consider an alternative problemŨ P , where we impose to the tariff p to be only continuous and non-decreasing, instead of being admissible.
• This alternative problem is simpler to solve. First, the structure of X is determined. Whenever H is constant, it is proven that X is of the form [a 0 , 1] meaning only the most efficient Agents select the contract. Whenever H is concave, X is of the form [0, 1] , meaning that the Principal not only selects the most efficient, but also the less efficient ones.
• Knowing the structure of X , we rewrite ∂p ∂x (t, x) as f (t, a 0 , b 0 ) using calculus of variations, we plug this expression intoŨ P in order to determine a 0 and b 0 .
• We finally verify whether the solution p for the alternative problem satisfies indeed the conditions of the initial problem, i.e. that it is admissible. By doing so, we are able to conclude that the solution p of the simpler problem, also solves the initial one of interest.
We compute that, whatever γ or H (constant or concave), the optimal tariff is a function of three components at most, namely a constant part p 3 , a proportional part p 2 of the consumed power c, and a proportional part
This tariff is always a concave increasing function of the consumed power c. Next, an important observation is that this tariff is quite simple and close to current tariff structures proposed by electricity providers. Indeed, these tariffs are commonly split into a fixed charge in e, a volumetric charge in e/MWh and possibly a demand charge in e/MW. The fixed and the volumetric charges can depend on the maximum subscribed power which is another way to price the demand charge. The optimal tariffs the Principal offers in our settings are summarized in the following tables, where the explicit expressions for the functions Table 2 : Optimal tariff of industrial consumers γ ∈ (0, 1)
Let us point out that the optimal tariffs are clearly interpretable, and the three components can be connected to electricity pricing standard issues. Clearly, in the obtained optimal tariff p 3 represents the fixed charge. The volumetric charge is the combination of a standard term p 2 (t)c plus p 1 (t)c γ . This last term is a way to charge more high demand consumers (indeed it only appears when c is high enough or when γ is positive, that is when the consumption of the Agent does not naturally saturate). Finally, no explicit demand charge appears but the coefficients p i depend on the maximum subscribed power c γ i , which limits the instantaneous power use and allows to charge more high power consumers. Let us point out that this method of electricity pricing is indeed implementable in practice, thanks to the recent spread ad development of smart meters, which enable a precise metering of electricity consumption and the dynamic management of maximum power (see for instance the USmartConsumer report [33] , which states that at the end of 2016, 30% of overall European electricity meters were equipped with smart technology). In addition, the peak/off-peak issues are handled by the temporal structure of the tariff: each component depends on time t. Therefore, high power consumption within peak period will be overcharged compared to off-peak period. Let us also notice that the proportional part p 1 (t) to c γ only depends on the Agent's utility parameters. Therefore this part should be common to any Principal whatever her cost of production, or the utility of reservation of the consumers.
The selected Agents are the most efficient when H is constant, which a classical result. But whenever H is concave, the Principal should also, in general, select Agents among the less efficient one. Indeed, when H is concave, reaching most efficient Agents is costly and it happens that getting less efficient Agents can in this case be profitable as they are easily satisfied. This type of feature seems to be uncommon in the Principal-Agent literature.
When H is constant, the tariff is a unique simple function of consumption, which even happens to be linear in c when γ < 0. When H is concave, the tariff is the combination of three functions depending on the level of consumption c. Nevertheless, observe that Agents who sign the contract never consume in the range [ĉ
. Hence, the tariff portion there only acts as a repellent part.
Economic interpretations and numerical results

Examples when H is constant
For a constant utility reservation, more efficient Agents are selected, and we present numerical illustrations in Figure 2 for negative and positive γ. As previously explained, the tariff structure is linear with the consumption when γ < 0 and is concave otherwise, which is represented in the upper graphics of Figure  2 . Middle graphics represent the utility Agents can obtain by signing the contract, depending on their type. If this utility level is smaller than their reservation utility (represented by the dashed line) they do not enter the contract and their consumption is null, as represented in the lower graphics. These utility representations also illustrate a classical result of informational rent: the most efficient Agents obtain a tariff inferior to what they are willing to pay, whereas the less efficient ones need to pay as much as they are able to, or are excluded.
Examples when H is concave
For a concave utility reservation, not only most efficient Agents are selected. We provide numerical illustrations where either the most or the less efficient Agents are selected on Figure 3 . First, let us analyze the example when H(x) = √ x and γ ∈ (0, 1), which corresponds to the left column. In this example, only the most efficient Agents sign the contract as they are the only ones obtaining a higher utility than their reservation one. As presented in the previous section, the tariff structure is the combination of three functions of consumption (upper graphics), but Agents who sign the contract only choose consumption such thatĉ γ 2 < c which corresponds to the concave tariff part p 1 (t) 3 c γ + p 3 2 (t)c + p 3 3 (t). When H(x) = log (x) and γ < 0 (the right column of figure 3), only less efficient Agents take the contract. Indeed, the concavity of the reservation utility makes it profitable for the Principal to select these Agents, rather than the most efficient ones. The tariff structure is again the combination of three functions of consumption (upper graphics) but Agents who sign the contract only take consumption such thatĉ γ 2 < c (of courseĉ 2 is different from the one in the previous example because we consider a different H). This again corresponds to the concave tariff part p 1 (t) 3 c γ + p 3 2 (t)c + p 3 3 (t).
Impact of competition when H is constant
When H increases because competition is for example more intense, the Principal adapts his tariff in order to remain competitive. In that case, the Principal mainly decreases the constant part p 3,γ of its tariff in order to attract consumers, see the left graphic of Figure 5 when γ < 0). The consumers selecting this new tariff obtain better conditions and as such consume more power, because it is cheaper, see the same example on the left graphic of Figure 4 when γ < 0. Therefore, when the Principal decreases his tariff, he does not decrease it enough in order to keep the same quantity of consumers: he accepts to retain less of them, but the selected ones do consume more, as represented on the right graphic of Figure  4 . Nevertheless, the utility of the Principal decreases with competition, see the right part of Figure 5 . At the extreme, the Principal even offers no tariff whenever H is too high. Observe that in this example, the fixed part of the tariff represents more than a half of the total cost of electricity for the consumers. 
Impact of cost of production when H is constant
For an increase of the cost of production K, the Principal also adapts his tariff in order to reflect this cost modification. In that case, the Principal mainly increases the proportional part p 2,γ of its tariff so that he continues to attract consumers, see the example for constant H and γ < 0 on the left part of Figure 7 . Consumers who select this new tariff are offered worse conditions, and as such consume less power, because it is more expensive, see the same example on the left graphic of Figure 6 . In addition, less consumers select the contract. Therefore, the utility of the Principal decreases with the cost of production, as illustrated in the right part of Figure 
Model specification
We now turn to a more precise presentation of the model and try to present it in a rather general setting. In particular, the specific assumptions on the shape on the utility, type distribution or cost functions will only be introduced later, in order present our results in a more explicit fashion.
In this model, the Principal is a power company, whose purpose is to offer to its clients a collection of tariffs in order to maximise its profits. The time horizon T > 0 is fixed. The following notations will be used throughout the article
• C represents the admissible levels of consumption for the Agents, and will either be R + or R * + depending on the utility function of the Agents.
• p : [0, T ] × C −→ R + is the tariff proposed by the Principal, such that p(t, c) represents the price of electricity at time t corresponding to a level of consumption c. Tariff's components (left) and Principal utility U P (right) against K; γ < 0.
• K : [0, T ] × C −→ R + is the cost of production of electricity for the Principal, such that K(t, c) represents the cost at time t for an aggregate level of production c. We assume that K is continuous in t, increasing, continuously differentiable and strictly convex in c.
• x is the Agent's type, assumed to take values in some subset X of R.
• c : [0, T ] × X −→ C is the consumption function, such that c(t, x) represents the consumption of electricity by an Agent of type x at time t.
• u : [0, T ] × X × C −→ R is the utility function of the Agents, such that u(t, x, c) represents the utility obtained by an Agent of type x at time t when he consumes c. We will always assume that the map c −→ u(t, x, c) is non-decreasing and concave for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X. Moreover, the map u is assumed to be jointly continuous, such that x −→ u(t, x, c) is non-decreasing and differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere for every (t, c) ∈ [0, T ] × C, and such that c −→ ∂u ∂x (t, x, c) is invertible. Finally, we assume that if C = R + , the value u(t, x, 0) ∈ R + is independent of x, and if C = R * + that lim c→0 u(t, x, c) = −∞, for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X. In other words, all the Agents have the same utility when they do not consume electricity.
• f : X −→ R + is the distribution of the Agent's type over the population. As is customary in adverse selection problems, f is supposed to be known by the Principal.
Agent's problem
Let us start by defining the consumption strategies that the Agents are allowed to use. A consumption strategy c will be said to be admissible, which we denote by c ∈ C, if it is a Borel measurable map from [0, T ] to C. Given a tariff p, that is a map from [0, T ] × R + to R, proposed by the Principal, an Agent of type x ∈ X determines his consumption by solving the following problem
The tariff that the Principal can offer to the Agents has to satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) and the individual rationality (IR) conditions. In our setting, there is no moral hazard, so that the incentive compatibility condition is automatically satisfied. Furthermore, the (IR) condition can be expressed through the set X(p) of the types of Agents which accept the contract p, which can be defined as
with a continuous and non-decreasing function H which represents the reservation utility of the Agents of different types, that is to say the utility that the Agents can hope to obtain by subscribing their power contract with a competitor. Agents for which the map U A (p, ·) is smaller than H will not accept the contract offered by the Principal.
We are now ready to give our definition of admissible tariffs, which uses vocabulary from u−convex analysis. We have regrouped all the pertinent results and definitions in Appendix A, for readers not necessary familiar with this theory.
Definition 4.1. A tariff p : [0, T ] × C −→ R will be said to be admissible, denoted by p ∈ P, if it satisfies
(ii) The map x −→ p (t, x) is continuous on X, differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere, for every t ∈ [0, T ], and satisfies
Let us comment on the above definition. First of all, the regularity assumptions are mainly technical. The main point here is that since only the clients with type in X(p) are going to accept the contract, the Principal will only have to face consumptions chosen by these clients. Besides, as we are going to prove in the the next proposition, this optimal consumption is exactly c (t, x). Therefore, any consumption c ∈ C which does not belong to the pre-image of X(p) will never have to be considered by the Principal. In particular, there is a degree of freedom when defining the value of p there. Indeed, if clients of some type x reject the contract p, they will reject any contract with a higher price. This is the reason why we do not impose the admissible tariffs to be u−convex on C but only on the corresponding pre-image of the set X(p).
Our main result in this section is
Proposition 4.1. For every p ∈ P and for almost every x ∈ X(p), we have
and the optimal consumption of Agents of type x at any time t ∈ [0, T ] is given by c (t, x) defined in (4.2).
In particular, X(p) can be defined through p only as follows
Proof. Since the space of admissible strategies for the Agent is decomposable and the integrand is normal when p is admissible (see Definitions 14.59 and 14.27 in Rockafellar and Wets [29] and also the particular case 14.29 of a Carethéodory integrand), we have from Theorem 14.60 in [29] that the solution of problem (4.1) is given by pointwise optimization. Moreover, ∂ p (t, x) is non-empty for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X(p), so we have that every optimal consumption strategy c :
Since u(t, x, 0) does not depend on x, the envelop Theorem ensures that the map x −→ p (t, x) is differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere and that we have for almost every (t,
Indeed, if c (t) > 0, that is the classical envelop Theorem. Otherwise, when C = R + , it is immediate to check, using the fact that u(t, x, 0) so that both terms in (4.3) are then actually equal to 0.
Then, since the map c −→
is a singleton, and the optimal consumption is c :
The Principal's problem
The Principal sets a tariff p ∈ P as a solution to his maximization problem
Using the results of Section 4.1, we can rewrite this problem in terms of p only as
Now notice that by (4.3), p is actually non-decreasing (since x −→ u(t, x, c) is non-decreasing for every (t, c) ∈ [0, T ]×C). Let us then consider the space C + of maps g, such that for every
is continuous and non-decreasing with
We shall actually consider the problem U P ≥ U P , defined by
where we have forgotten the implicit link existing between p and p , which explains why we have in general U P ≥ U P . We will see in the frameworks described below that we can give conditions under which the two problems are indeed equal. The main advantage of U P is that it no longer contains the condition that p has to be u−convex, a constraint that is not easy to consider in full generality.
Besides, we also emphasize that since the elements of C + are non-decreasing with respect to x, they are also differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere, so that U P is indeed well defined. Our aim now will be to compute U P . However, the present framework is far too general to hope obtaining explicit solutions, which are of the utmost interest in our electricity pricing model, so that we will concentrate our attention on the case of Agents with power-type utilities. In the next Section, we will focus on the particular case where the reservation utility H is constant, and shall consider the more general case where it may depend on the Agents' type in Section 6.
Constant reservation utility
In this section, we shall use the following standing assumptions
(ii) We have for every
for some γ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), some map g γ : X −→ R + which is continuous, increasing if γ ∈ (0, 1), decreasing if γ ∈ (−∞, 0), and for some continuous map φ :
Let us comment on this modeling choice for the utility function. The term g γ (x) represents the willingness of the Agents to pay for their consumption, i.e. their need for energy depends on their type. The term φ is common to every type of Agents and represents the fact that (almost) everyone is eager to consume at the same time (for example during the day rather than at night). Furthermore, we consider both the cases γ ∈ (0, 1), which would be the classical power utility function, as well as the case γ < 0, which corresponds to a situation where Agents actually cannot avoid consuming electricity, as it would provide them a utility equal to −∞, which may be seen as more realistic. As discussed previously, taking γ ∈ (0, 1) identifies to considering industrial Agents, as γ < 0 more typically refers to residential Agents. Equation (4.2) now can be written as
By inserting the previous expression in equation (4.4) and using that
the problem to solve can now be expressed as
We consider in this section a further simplification, related to the reservation utility of the Agents, which we suppose to be independent of their type. This assumption will be relieved in Section 6 hereafter.
Assumption
Under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, the (IR) condition reduces to
Since p is non-decreasing in x we have for any
Therefore, the set X (p ) has necessarily the form
where x 0 ∈ [0, 1] needs to be determined and verifies, by continuity, that P (x 0 ) = H. This means that the Principal will only offer contracts to Agents of type greater than x 0 . The problem (5.2) can therefore be written equivalently
with
Let us end this section with the following sufficient condition of u−convexity when Assumption 5.1 holds. Its proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Lemma 5.1. Let Assumption 5.1 hold and suppose in addition that g γ is concave if γ ∈ (0, 1) and convex if γ ∈ (−∞, 0). Let ψ : [0, T ] × X −→ R be a map such that x −→ ψ(t, x) is non-decreasing and convex. Then ψ is u−convex. Furthermore, if we take
General distribution of costs and Agent types
Denote by F the cumulative distribution function of the types of Agents. By integration by parts we have for every x 0 ∈ [0, 1] and every p ∈ C + (x 0 )
We therefore end up with the maximization problem
We can now state our main result of this section, wholes proof is postponed to Appendix B. It requires the introduction of the following function
where A(t, x 0 ) is defined
and x 0 is any maximizer of the map and
If the map defined on [0, 1] by (4.4) . Furthermore, the Principal only signs contracts with the Agents of type x ∈ [x 0 , 1].
(iii) Finally, in the case γ ∈ (0, 1), if f is non-increasing and the map
is increasing over the set L := {x ∈ [0, 1], β(x) > 0}, then x 0 is unique and is characterized by the equation
The same result holds in the case γ ∈ (−∞, 0) if f is non-decreasing and β is decreasing over L.
An explicit example
We insist on the fact that the tariff p defined in Theorem 5.1 is u−convex by definition, and it is finite since it is written as a supremum of a continuous function over a compact set. In order to verify that p ∈ P, one therefore only needs to make sure that p is indeed the u−transform of p (which is the case if p is u−convex) and satisfies the other required properties. We will consider here a simplified framework where all the computations can be done almost explicitly.
Assumption 5.3. The cost function K is given, for some n > 1, by
for some map k : [0, T ] −→ R + . Moreover, the distribution of the type of Agents is uniform, that is f (x) = 1, and we impose g γ (x) := x1 γ∈(0,1) + (1 − x)1 γ<0 , for every x ∈ [0, 1].
Under Assumption 5.3, we then have
and the maximization problem becomes
where we emphasize that since n > 1, when γ ∈ (0, 1), we easily have that B γ (T ) > 0, while B γ (T ) < 0 when γ < 0. Furthermore, we remind the reader that when γ > 0, the reservation utility of the Agents is necessarily non-negative, while it has to be negative when γ < 0, since the utility function itself is negative.
Our result rewrites in this case
(i) If γ ∈ (0, 1), then, the optimal tariff p ∈ P is given for any (t, c)
where
and where x 0 is the unique solution in (1/2, 1) of the equation
Furthermore, only the Agents of type x ≥ x 0 will accept the contract.
(ii) If γ < 0, then, the optimal tariff p ∈ P is given for any (t, c)
and where
Type-dependent reservation utilities
In this part we study the case where the reservation utility H is a general continuous and non-decreasing function of the Agent type x ∈ [0, 1]. This case strongly differs from the previous section as the existence of a solution to the infinite-dimensional problem faced by the Principal is not guaranteed and we need to impose some additional structure to the set of admissible tariffs. Specifically, we will consider a new set of admissible tariffs which is contained in a reflexive Banach space and we will use the classical results from functional analysis to prove the existence of solutions to the Principal's problem. With that purpose in mind, we introduce the following Sobolev-like spaces. 
1 That is to say the usual Sobolev space of maps admitting a weak first order derivative.
Remark 6.1. For the rest of the paper, for every map q belonging to some space W 1,
x (O), the set N (q) will make reference to the one mentioned in Definition 6.1.
For all the analysis of this section, we fix a number m > 1 such that mγ < 1. We are now ready to give our new definition of admissible tariffs. In this new setting, the Principal offers a tariff p ∈ P which solves his maximization problem
Following the previous sections, we will consider the problem U P ≥ U P , defined by
. We aim at solving U P and give conditions under which it coincides with U P . Now, moving to the reservation utility function H, recall that it determines the set X (p ). In order to avoid complex forms of this set we make the following assumption on g, H and f . 
Moreover, the following maps
Remark 6.2. Condition (6.3) is equivalent to the elasticity of reservation utility being less than the elasticity of willingness to pay for consumption. For instance, in the case γ ∈ (0, 1), it is automatically satisfied when H is constant and if g γ (x) = x then (6.3) reduces to H being concave. Similarly, in the case γ < 0, (6.3) holds if g γ (x) = 1 − x and H(x) = x α with α > 1. On the other hand, if for instance, f (x) = 1 and g(x) = x α with α ∈ (0, 1], then v 1 , v 2 are increasing when α ≥ 1 − γ.
The following proposition shows that when Condition (6.3) holds, it is actually never optimal for the Principal to propose a tariff for which the (IR) condition is binding on any measurable subset of [0, 1] with positive Lebesgue measure. Its proof is postponed to Appendix C. Proposition 6.1. Let Assumptions 5.1 and 6.1 hold, and let p ∈ C + be any function such that the set
has positive Lebesgue measure. Then p is not optimal for problem (6.2).
In this section, we show that the problem splits into subintervals. Thanks to the previous proposition, we can consider without loss of generality functions p ∈ C + such that the Lebesgue measure of Y (p ) is zero. For these functions, we define the set
which by continuity is an open subset of [0, 1]. As X and p are continuous, we can replace all the integrals over X (p ) by integrals over X (p ) and we can write the latter set as a countable union of open disjoint intervals, that is
for some a 0 ∈ (0, 1], b 0 ∈ [0, 1), and 0 < a n < b n < 1, ∀n ≥ 0. We denote a := (a n ) n≥0 , b := (b n ) n≥0 and define A as the set of such that pairs (a, b). For any (a, b) ∈ A, we also define the set
Remark 6.3. The case b 0 = 0 stands for P (b 0 ) < H(b 0 ) and the case a 0 = 1 stands for P (a 0 ) < H(a 0 ). By continuity we have P (a n ) = H(a n ) and P (b n ) = H(b n ) for every n ≥ 1.
We can therefore write
where C + (a, b) is given by all the maps p ∈ C + such that X (p ) = X (a, b). Define for every (a, b) ∈ A the operator Ψ (a,b) :
We optimize first with respect to p , and then study the problem
Our first result gives the existence of a solution to the above infinite-dimensional optimization problem, and requires the following assumption, which involves mainly the cost function. It is required in order to obtain nice coercivity properties Assumption 6.2. The cost function K satisfies the following growth condition
where the map k : [0, T ] −→ R + is bounded from below by some constant k > 0 and n ≥ 1. Moreover, we have that
We now have Proposition 6.2. Let Assumptions 5.1 and 6.2 hold. For every (a, b) ∈ A, the optimization problem (P a,b ) has at least one solution.
Next, we obtain necessary optimality conditions for (P a,b ). Recalling from Remark 6.3 that the (IR) condition is binding at each a n , b n , by integration by parts we can rewrite Ψ (a,b) as
To simplify notations, denote
Theorem 6.1. Let Assumptions 5.1 and 6.2 hold and let p be a solution of (P a,b ). Consider an interval I = (x , x r ) ⊆ X (a, b) such that P (x) > H(x) for every x ∈ I, P (x ) = H(x l ) and P (x r ) = H(x r ). Then there exists a null set N ⊂ [0, T ] and a constant µ t for every t ∈ [0, T ] \ N such that the following optimality condition is satisfied (i) In the case I ⊆ (a 0 , 1), for every x ∈ I we have
(ii) In the case I ⊆ (0, b 0 ) ∪ n≥1 (a n , b n ), for every x ∈ I we have
The proof of the Theorem 6.1 consists in several technical propositions which are given and proved in Section C.2 below.
The next and last proposition of this section proves the convexity of the solutions to problems (P a,b ) over intervals where the (IR) condition is not binding. This result will allow us to completely solve the Principal's problem in the next subsection, when the function H is strictly concave.
Proposition 6.3. Let Assumptions 5.1, 6.1 and 6.2 hold. Let p be a solution to problem (P a,b ). Then P is convex on every interval over which P is strictly greater than H.
Proof. From Assumption 6.1 and Theorem 6.1 we have that on every interval I over which P > H, there exists a null set
is non-decreasing on I. Therefore P is convex on I since
Strictly concave reservation utility
In this section we show that there are at most that most effective and less effective Agents who select the contract.
Assumption 6.3. The map x −→ H(x) is strictly concave and non-decreasing.
The main interest of Assumption 6.3 is the following simple result, which shows that we can always restrict our attention to sets X with a very simple form.
Proposition 6.4. Let Assumptions 5.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. Let (a, b) ∈ A be such that 0 < a n 0 < b n 0 < 1 for some n 0 ≥ 1. Then the solution to problem (P a,b ) is not optimal for problem (6.2).
Proof. Let p be the solution of problem (P a,b ). We will prove that P ≡ H in the interval (a n 0 , b n 0 ) and the result will follow from Proposition 6.1. Suppose not, then there exists x 0 ∈ (a n 0 , b n 0 ) such that P (x 0 ) > H(x 0 ) and p is given by (6.6) in a neighbourhood around x 0 , so P is increasing in that neighbourhood. By Proposition 6.3 we have that P (b n 0 ) > H(b n 0 ), because on every interval which is contained in the set {x, P (x) ≥ H(x)} the convex map P and the strictly concave map H can intersect at most at one point. This contradicts the fact that p ∈ C + (a, b). 2
In the rest of this section, we start by deriving a general solution under some implicit assumptions, and then show that the latter can be verified in the context of Assumption 5.3.
The general tariff
Proposition 6.4 implies that the solution of (6.4) is attained for some p satisfying
We expect then the optimal tariff to look like the curve in Figure 8 .
Let us then define the set
Theorem 6.1 gives us only partial information about the solution of the problem (P a,b ), for (a, b) ∈ A 2 . Now that we assume in addition that H is strictly concave, we can actually complete that information with the following proposition, which tells us that the value of the constants µ t is zero in the intervals of the form [0, b) and (a, 1]. Its proof is postponed to the Appendix. Following the computations of Section 5, we define
The aim of the next proposition is similar in spirit to that of Proposition 6.4, in the sense that it allows to exclude many specifications of (a, b) ∈ A 2 when one is interested in solving problem (6.2). Proposition 6.6. Let Assumptions 5.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. Let p be a solution of (P a,b ). If either
then the solution to problem (P a,b ) is not optimal for problem (6.2).
Judging by the results of Proposition 6.6, it is natural to define A 2 as the set of all the pairs (a, b) ∈ A 2 for which
Thanks to Proposition 6.6, we have thus reduced the problem (P a,b ) to A(t, a 0 , b 0 ) )
where we abused notations and defined the corresponding functions
Since all these maps are continuous on [0, 1] 2 , the supremum over the compact set above is attained at some (a 0 , b 0 ) ∈ A 2 . We have therefore proved Theorem 6.2. Let Assumptions 5.1, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 hold. We have (i) The maximum in (6.2) is attained for the map
wherep (t, x) is any continuous and non-decreasing map (with respect to x) such that
If p is u−convex on X (p ), then p is the optimal tariff for the problem (6.1). Furthermore, the Principal only signs contracts with the Agents of type
Power type cost function
Exactly as in the case where H was independent of x, the computations become much simpler as soon as Assumption 5.3 holds. Let's note R γ (a 0 , b 0 ) = 1 + (2b 0 )
Then, the functions and A are given, for any
So, in order to obtain (a 0 , b 0 ) we have to solve
Let us now compute the associated tariff p and check that p indeed belongs to P and that its u−transform is p . Fix some t ∈ [0, T ] and define
Recall that by Proposition 6.6, the following inequalities must be satisfied
Notice in particular that when γ ∈ (0, 1), (6.9) implies that a 0 > 1/2, since H is increasing. With similar computations as in Section 5.2, we compute that
Actually, in this case, the map p will be u−convex if and only if the following implicit assumption holds.
Assumption 6.4. The solutions (a 0 , b 0 ) of (6.8) are such that
Our main result in this case reads.
and when γ < 0 by
where 
Furthermore, the Principal will only choose clients with type
General reservation utility
In this section, we want to point out that the assumption of the reservation utility function H being strictly concave is not mandatory in order to solve problem (6.2), and we intend to explain in which other cases we can hope to solve it.
In order to reduce problem (6.2) to a finite dimensional problem, we just need H to have at most a finite number of intersecting points with a strictly convex function. If H were to satisfy this property, then we would be able to prove a result similar to Proposition 6.4, and we would know that the optimal set X (p ) is a finite union of intervals contained in [0, 1].
The next step then is to prove that the Lagrange multipliers µ t in Theorem 6.1 are equal to zero, using for instance local perturbations as we did to prove Proposition 6.5. This would allow to solve the optimality conditions (6.6) and (6.7) by using the corresponding auxiliary map A(a, b). We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 6.1. Suppose that for some α, β ≥ 0 and x h ∈ [0, 1], H has the form
Such a reservation utility accounts for the fact that all the Agents, whatever their appetence for power consumption is, should at least receive a minimal level of utility, in this case β. Though in general two convex functions can intersect at countably many points, given the specific form of H, it can intersect an increasing and convex function at at most three points, as shown in Figure 9 .
Therefore, we deduce that X (p ) has the following form
We define then the set
After proving that the Lagrange multipliers µ t in Theorem 6.1 are equal to zero, Problem (P a,b ) becomes, abusing notations slightly
where for any (t, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide an explicit formulation of optimal electricity tariffs, from the point of view of a power company offering her service to consumers facing alternatives for satisfying energy requirements. It covers the adverse selection feature of Agents, which has been empirically highlighted in the literature [26] , as electricity consumers tend to select time-dependent tariff whenever they consume little during peak hours. From this perspective, our results differ from the existing analysis in the literature on electricity pricing, which mainly focused on the point of view of a monopoly needing to recover its costs, such as in the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing described in [4] or in [27] . Our main results is the derivation of time-dependent and consumption-based optimal tariffs. They act in several ways in order to reflect the increasing marginal cost of electricity production with the aggregate consumption, by
• making electricity more expensive in peak hours;
• increasing the marginal price of high consumption power units;
• excluding effectively some of the consumers, by offering a tariff, which is too expensive in comparison to turning to alternative retailers or sources of energy, or simply to dropping out of business altogether.
Our tariff structure can compare to common electricity tariffs which are often linear functions of the consumed energy (see for example the Australia Queensland tariffs 2 ). Indeed, our tariff is either linear or concave, in which case it could be approximated for example by a set of non-crossing linear functions of consumed power, these linear functions having a maximum power and a fixed charge increasing relative to this power limit. Interestingly, this kind of tariff structure looks quite similar to the regulated electricity tariff menu offered to residential consumers in France 3 . The main distinction is the concavity of our optimal tariff with respect to the power limit, whereas the French regulated tariff is convex. This difference may be induced by our limitation to offering a single tariff instead of a menu of contracts. By doing so, our tariff intends to address all consumers in a single function. As a future research project, we are planing to tackle the extension of our modeling to a menu of tariff, allowing more flexibility for handling adverse selection.
This paper is but the first step in the direction we have outlined. In addition to extend the analysis to a menu of tariffs, at this stage, there is no uncertainty in our model, and Agents commit for a definite period [0, T ]. At a later stage, we plan to incorporate uncertainties in the model: there are fluctuations in the prices of primary energies and changes in uses of electricity, and domestic consumption is subject to weather conditions. Expanding the characteristics of Agents in order to model their ability to modulate their consumption is a possible extension; see for example [22] for an analysis of rational consumers who react imperfectly to prices or [30] for a model with a portion of consumers who cannot modify their consumption. One can also consider more sophisticated but existing contracts, allowing for instance the producer to cut supply a certain number of days during the year. One should also take into account the existence of a spot market for electricity, which creates arbitrage opportunities for the Agents. Most tantalizing are the congestion problems: peak hours are not seasonal, they result from aggregate behavior, which is strategic in nature, and call for an analysis in terms of mean field games.
A u−convex analysis
We first recall the definition of u−convexity (adapted to our context, we refer the reader to the monograph by Villani [34] on optimal transport theory for more details). 
Similarly, a map Φ : [0, T ] × X −→ R ∪ {+∞} is said to be u−convex if it is proper and there exists some
We recall the following easy characterization of u−convexity. Proof. We only prove the first statement, the other one being exactly similar. The result is an easy consequence of the fact that for any map φ : [0, T ] × C −→ R ∪ {+∞}, we have the identity
Indeed, we have by definition that for any
Choosing x = x, we immediately get that ((φ ) ) (t, x) ≤ φ (t, x), while the converse inequality is obtained by choosing c = c . 2
Next, we can define the notion of the u−subdifferential of a u−convex function.
Similarly, let ψ : [0, T ] × X −→ R ∪ {+∞} be a u−convex function. For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X, the u−subdifferential of ψ at the point (t, x) is the set ∂ ψ(t, x) ⊂ R + defined by ∂ ψ(t, x) := {c ∈ C, ψ (t, c) = u(t, x, c) − ψ(t, x)} .
Notice that since the map u is continuous, a u−convex function is automatically lower-semicontinuous and its u−subdifferential is a closed set.
B Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. By Lemma A.1, we know that the u−convexity of ψ is equivalent to
First notice that since ψ is convex in y and gγ γ is concave, then for any
is monotone on (0, +∞) and therefore quasiconcave. Since [0, 1] is convex and compact, we can apply Sion's minimax theorem [31] to obtain that
since ψ is non-decreasing.
Finally, it is easy to see that when g γ is defined as in the statement of the lemma, we have
{(x − y)c + ψ(t, y)} , which corresponds to the classical convex conjugate, hence the desired result by Fenchel-Moreau's theorem. 2 Proof of Theorem 5.1. We optimize first with respect to p . For fixed x 0 , start by defining Ψ x 0 :
Ψ x 0 is clearly continuous and Fréchet differentiable and it is also concave because K is convex in c.
where we defined
Since Ψ x 0 is concave, the necessary and sufficient optimality condition for the problem with fixed x 0 is
where T C + (x 0 ) (p ) denotes the tangent cone to the closed set C + (x 0 ) at the point p defined by
Using local functions we see that the inequality (B.3) must be satisfied almost everywhere on
Therefore, the optimal p ∈ C + (x 0 ) should verify
with a + = max{a, 0}, the positive part operator. By the above equation, we must have
Since K is strictly convex and increasing with respect to c, it can be checked directly that g K is increasing as well (on R + ), so that we deduce
Therefore the solution to the problem with fixed x 0 is given by (B.4). We have thus reduced the problem (5.4) to
Seen as a function of x 0 , the right-hand side above is clearly a continuous function. It therefore attains its maximum over the compact set [0, 1] at some (possibly non unique) x 0 . We will abuse notations and denote by x 0 a generic maximizer.
If p is u−convex, since p is also u−convex (by definition), then p is necessarily the u−transform of p and therefore p ∈ P, which means that we actually have U P = U P . For the uniqueness result, define
Note that α does not attain its maximum over any interval outside L, because there is constant (and therefore A(t, ·) too) and F is increasing. Then, since over L we have
Under the hypotheses of the theorem, α is decreasing over L in each one of the two cases so α is strictly concave. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We divide the proof in two cases.
• Case 1: γ ∈ (0, 1)
In this case we have
Hence, it is clear that x 0 −→ Φ(x 0 ) is increasing in [0, 
we deduce
Next, we can check directly that Φ is concave on [0, 1], and we have for any y 0 ∈ [0, 1]
Denote finally for any y 0 ∈ [0, 1]
We have for any y 0 ∈ [0, 1]
since γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, since in addition we have χ(0) = H > 0, and lim
there is a unique y 0 ∈ (0, 1) (and thus a unique x 0 ∈ (1/2, 1)) such that Φ (y 0 ) = 0, at which the maximum of Φ is attained. Finally, we can compute explicitly p (t, x) for any (t,
where we defined for simplicity
It can then be checked directly that for any c ≥ 0, the map x −→ xφ(t)c γ /γ − p (t, x) is concave on [0, 1] and attains its maximum at the point
Therefore, we deduce immediately that for any (t, c)
Next, we notice that for any
, and that it is concave on R + if x ≥ 1/2, so that it attains its maximum at the point
It is also immediate that p is always non-decreasing and is convex, and therefore u−convex by Lemma 5.1, so much so that we conclude that p ∈ P.
It can easily be shown that the following suboptimal but simpler tariff will give the same results in terms of selected Agents, optimal consumption and Principal's utility. Indeed as no consumer select c > It can easily be shown that the following suboptimal but simpler tariff will give the same results in terms of selected Agents, optimal consumption and Principal's utility because no consumer selects c >
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Note that in the optimization problem (P a,b ) we can without loss of generality restrict our attention to the feasible maps on [0, T ] × X (a, b). In other words, for fixed (a, b) ∈ A, we define the closed and convex set F a,b as the set of maps q ∈ W 1.m x (X (a, b)) such that for every t ∈ [0, T ], x −→ q(t, x) is continuous and non-decreasing, Q(x) := T 0 q(t, x)dt ≥ H(x) for every x ∈ X (a, b) and Q(a n ) = H(a n ), Q(b n ) = H(b n ) for every n ≥ 1.
We show that Ψ (a,b) , seen on the Banach space W 1,m
x (X (a, b) ), || · || m,X (a,b) , is coercive on F a,b .
• Case 1: γ ∈ (0, 1) X (a, b) , we have that
Next, define
From Jensen's inequality for the maps ψ A (x) = x 1 γm , ψ B (x) = x n γm , we have that (recall that m is such that γm < 1 and that n > 1)
.
We have therefore proved that, denoting by m the conjugate of m
This with (C.1) implies clearly that Ψ (a,b) is indeed coercive in F a,b .
• Case 2: γ < 0
In this case
Then, from (C.1) and the positiveness of K we conclude that Ψ (a,b) is coercive in F a,b .
To conclude the proof, note that W 1,m , b) ) is a reflexive Banach space, so the coercivity of Ψ (a,b) implies that it possesses at least a maximizer p in F a,b . Therefore any q ∈ W 1.m x (0, 1), continuous and non-decreasing in x, which coincides with p in X (a, b) and such that Q(x) = T 0 q(t, x)dt satisfies Q(x) < H(x) for x ∈ [0, 1] \ X (a, b) is a solution to (P a,b ).
We state the following Lemma before proving Proposition 6.5.
Lemma C.1. Let p be a solution of (P a,b ). Define g(x)f (x) + g (x)F (x) − g (x) > 0.
Then, for any q ∈ W 1,m
x (0, 1) satisfying q(t, x) = 0, ∀(t, x) ∈ T a 0 × [x 1 , 1], x −→ q(t, x) is increasing in [x 1 , x 2 ], ∀t ∈ T a 0 , and q(t, x) = q(t, x 2 ), ∀(t, x) ∈ T a 0 × [x 2 , 1], the map p + εq belongs to C + (a, b) for ε ≥ 0. Therefore Ψ (a,b) (p ; q) ≤ 0,, which means
hence a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6.5. Let us prove the case I ⊂ (a 0 , 1), the case I ⊂ (0, b 0 ) being similar. From the convexity of P on every interval over which P is strictly greater than H we deduce the existence of c 0 ∈ [a 0 , 1) such that P (x) > H(x) for every x ∈ (c 0 , 1] and P (x) = H(x) for every x ∈ [a 0 , c 0 ]. It follows from Lemma C.1 that either T a 0 is a null set or for every t ∈ T a 0 the optimality conditions from Theorem 6.1 hold with µ t = 0. Call T 1 = [0, T ] \ (N ∪ T a 0 ) and define for every t ∈ T 1 x 1 (t) = inf x ∈ (c 0 , 1) : ∂p ∂x (t, x) > 0 .
We have that p (t, ·) is strictly increasing in [x 1 (t), 1] and it is given by (6.6). Define next T + 1 := {t ∈ T 1 , µ t > 0} , T − 1 := {t ∈ T 1 , µ t < 0} .
We will prove that T − ∂q ∂x (t, x)µ t dxdt, we conclude that T − 1 is a null set. Next, take anyx ∈ (c 0 , 1) such that P (x) > H(x) and for every t ∈ T , x≥x 1 (t)} ∂p ∂x (t, x 1 (t))(x − x 1 (t)) + p (t, x 1 (t)) − p (t, x) p (t, 1) − p (t, x 1 (t)) − ∂p ∂x (t, x 1 (t))(1 − x 1 (t)) ∆.
Since p (t, ·) is convex, we have that q is non-increasing, p (t, ·) + εq(t, ·) is non-decreasing for ε ∼ 0 and p(t, 1) + q(t, 1) = p(t, 1) − ∆. Therefore p + εq ∈ C + (a, b) for ε ∼ 0 so Ψ (p ; q) ≤ 0. Since Ψ (p ; q) = Proof of Proposition 6.6. We show that under the conditions of the proposition, P ≡ H over some subset of (0, Proof of Theorem 6.3. First of all, we recall that we have a degree of freedom in choosing the mapp to which p is equal on [b 0 , a 0 ], since it does not play any role in criterion that p maximises. Of course, if we want to be able to conclude, this map has to be u−convex in the end. Therefore, if we can choose it so that p is C 1 and convex in x, we can apply Lemma 5.1 and conclude that p is indeed u−convex. This can be made if and only if the derivative of p at a 0 is greater or equal to the derivative of p at b 0 , which can be shown immediately to be equivalent to, regardless of the value of γ,
Furthermore, if this is not satisfied, then p is not convex, and we can apply the second part of Lemma 5.1 to conclude that p is not u−convex.
We now divide the proof in two steps.
• Case (i): γ ∈ (0, 1).
Given the discussion above, in this case the only thing we have to do is to compute p. Denote for simplicity
We know that the map x −→ xφ(t)c γ /γ − p (t, x) is concave on [0, 1]. Notice as well that since a 0 > 1/2, we have 1/2 ≥ a 0 − 1/2 ≥ b 0 . We can then compute its maximum and obtain directly that it is attained We deduce that p(t, c) =
As in the case H constant, it can easily be shown that the following simpler tariff is also admissible and produce the same results as no consumer selects c > L γ (t)2 • Case (ii): γ < 0. As in the previous case, our assumptions imply that a 0 ≥ 1/2 and 1/2 ≥ a 0 − 1/2 ≥ b 0 . We can then prove that the maximum of the map x −→ xφ(t)c γ /γ − p (t, x) is attained at 
